Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Information Barriers, Export Promotion Institutions, and the Extensive Margin of Trade

Introduction
Information incompleteness is an important barrier to trade. The severity of this problem is likely to vary across trade activities. Thus, obstacles are expectedly larger when expanding exports along the extensive margin (i.e., introducing new goods or adding new countries to the set of destination markets) than along the intensive margin (i.e., increasing exports of already exported goods or to countries that are already among the trading partners). Furthermore, information-related impediments to trade can be anticipated to vary with the nature of the goods being traded. In particular, they are larger for more differentiated goods, whose multidimensional characteristics do not allow for prices to fully play their signaling function. Trade promotion actions aiming at reducing information gaps should therefore have larger effects on the extensive margin of these goods' exports. This provides a natural strategy to identify the influence of export promotion institutions on trade. In this paper, we precisely explore whether and how these institutions influence the extensive margin of exports across goods with varying degree of differentiation on a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries over the period 1995-2004. Export promotion policies can be rationalized as responses to market failures associated with information spillovers originated in successful searches of business opportunities abroad and informational asymmetries between trading parties (see, e.g., Rauch, 1996; Copeland, 2007) .
1 Whether these public interventions have been actually effective in correcting such market failures thus allowing for increased trade has been object of an intense debate. Empirical evidence thereon is essentially based on countrycase studies (see, e.g., Álvarez and Crespi, 2000; Gil et al., 2008; Volpe Martincus and Carballo, 2008) and most of the existing literature relies on highly specific geographically and/or sectorally limited samples. In short, cross-country investigations are virtually absent and this raises the question to what extent established findings are applicable to other countries. Three exceptions to this general picture are the studies by Rose (2007) , Lederman et al. (2006) , and Volpe . Rose (2007) assesses the impact of diplomatic foreign missions on countries' aggregate bilateral trade using a gravity model on a sample of 22 exporting, mostly developed countries. 2 He finds that each additional diplomatic representation is associated with six to ten percent larger exports. Lederman et al. (2006) perform a cross-country econometric analysis of the impact of export promotion agencies on country's total exports. They conclude that these agencies have a strong and statistically significant effect, in particular, they claim that for each dollar of export promotion, exports increase by 40 dollars for the median agency.
Volpe , in turn, estimate gravity equations to assess the role played by both diplomatic foreign missions and offices of export promotion agencies abroad in shaping bilateral exports from Latin American and Caribbean countries along the intensive and extensive margins. They find that these institutions have a lager impact on the extensive margin of exports, especially in the case of trade promotion organizations.
While insightful, these analyses fall short to uncover how export promotion institutions specifically affect countries' export diversification profiles, i.e., whether they contribute to expand trade uniformly or non-uniformly or non-uniformly across product groups.
This natural next step is what we do in this paper. We specifically address one main question: Have export promotion institutions asymmetric effects on the extensive margins of exports of goods with varying degree of differentiation? We believe that this is a policy relevant question for countries such as those in Latin America and the Caribbean.
These countries have traditionally lagged behind in terms of export diversification. In particular, they have been highly specialized in natural resources and primary products.
Just to mention two examples, only one product, coffee, represented on average more than 60% of total Colombian exports over the period , whereas oil has accounted for more than 80% of Venezuelan total exports in recent years.
In addressing the former question, we empirically estimate the impact of trade promotion institutions on the extensive margin of exports as measured by the number of 6-digit HS products exported in each good category identified in the classification developed by Rauch (1999) while controlling for the standard gravity variables. This 2 Furthermore, Nitsch (2007a) reports that state visits have on average a positive impact on bilateral exports. Moreover, Rose (2004 Rose ( , 2005 and Nitsch (2007b) analyze the influence of international organizations and country groupings such as the G7 on trade flows, respectively.
analysis is performed separately for each 2-digit SITC "sector" to allow for heterogeneity in the impact of the aforementioned institutions across these sectors.
We find that offices of export promotion agencies located abroad seem to favor an increase of the extensive margin of exports of differentiated goods. On the other hand, the presence of a larger number of diplomatic representations in the importer country is associated with exports of a larger number of homogeneous goods. These findings have a clear explanation. Specialized, export oriented offices abroad may be more effective in helping ameliorate the more severe informational problems linked to exporting more differentiated goods. Embassies and consulates perform more general functions and in many cases they do not even have a commercial section, so not being specific export promoting institutions, they are more likely to facilitate exports of homogeneous products, whose trade faces weaker informational barriers and thus have lower marketing expertise requirements.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the empirical approach. In particular, it specifies the estimation equation and addresses the main econometric problems. Section 3 introduces the dataset and presents descriptive evidence.
Section 4 reports and discusses the estimation results, and Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Methodology
We empirically assess the effect of export promotion institutions on the extensive margin of countries' exports using a gravity model of trade. Specifically, we estimate by OLS the following equation: 
where k indexes sectors, z type of goods (homogeneous, reference-priced, and differentiated), i exporter countries, j importer countries, and t time; N is the number of products exported in the relevant sector and good category; TPO is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the trade promotion organization of the exporter country has an office in the importer country and 0 otherwise; EmbCon is the number of diplomatic representations (embassies and consulates) of the exporter country in the importer country; remaining variables control for other factors that are likely to affect bilateral trade flows: (the natural logarithm of) the distance between (the main cities in) the trading partners (Dist); sharing a common land border (Cont); membership in the same preferential trade agreement (PTA), sharing a common language (Lang), former colonial ties (ColTies), sharing the same colonizer (ComCol), and whether there are island (Is) or landlocked (Land) countries among the trading partners; i δ , j λ , and t  are exporter, importer, and year fixed effects;  is the stochastic error. Equation (1) is estimated sector-by-sector. Estimating this equation using aggregate data would only be appropriate if the parameters were constrained to be equal across sectors. This restriction is unlikely to hold in general. Thus, for the exporter and importer fixed effects to effectively control for inter-sectoral determinants of comparative advantage they must sector specific (see Hallak, 2006 ).
More importantly, we expect the impact of export promotion institutions to differ across sectors. This would be the case because countries' varying sectoral comparative advantage will determine different sectoral capabilities to exploit a given reduction of trade costs such as the amelioration of information problems enabled by the aforementioned institutions. Furthermore, heterogeneity across sectors might be created by the different nature of the sectors' average goods and the associated information problems involved in their trade.
In this sense, as mentioned above, information costs are likely to specifically differ across groups of goods. In particular, in the case of highly differentiated products prices cannot convey all the relevant information for international trade (see Rauch, 1999) . So their trade requires more communication, i.e., the volume and complexity of information exchanged between trading partners are larger (see Harris, 1995) . 5 As a consequence, the 4 Our survey suggests that trade promotion agencies operate abroad either directly through own offices or, in some cases, through embassies and consulates. Further, some countries have both offices of their agencies and diplomatic representations in certain importing economies. In particular, with only a few exceptions, offices of trade promotion organizations are located in countries where there is at least one diplomatic representation, which most likely has been opened before. Hence, these offices are in fact an additional presence of trade promotion institutions in the importer country and therefore their impact on trade is most properly compared to that of additional diplomatic missions as opposed to the existence of such missions at all (i.e., a count variable instead of a binary variable). 5 Consistently, the existent empirical evidence indicates that the trade reducing effect of communication costs is larger for differentiated goods (see Fink et al., 2005) . Similarly, Portes et al. (2001) find that information flows are more important for less value of the information institutions disseminate and henceforth their effects may be also expected to differ across goods according to their degree of differentiation. In fact, this is what has been observed in the case of Chinese trading networks (see Rauch and Trindade, 2002) . 6 A similar impact could also be anticipated in the case of trade promotion organizations. These organizations are likely to close information gaps proportionally more and thereby have a larger impact in promoting new exports in the case of differentiated goods than in the case of homogeneous goods, thus potentially influencing the countries' specialization profiles. Formally, we expect
Furthermore, export promotion agencies are generally endowed with personnel with specialized marketing expertise and are therefore a priori in a better position to alleviate the specific information problems impeding exports of new complex products than pure diplomatic missions. Embassies and consulates, on the other hand, tend to provide nonspecific services such as those aiming at strengthening the country's image abroad, which would a priori seem to be more suitable to support trade in homogeneous goods, i.e., the ones which account for the largest fraction of Latin American and Caribbean countries exports. We therefore hypothesize
In assessing the significance of these estimated coefficients, the panel nature of the data should be explicitly taken into account. More precisely, disturbances can be expected to have specific patterns associated with the presence of groups of observations (see, e.g. Greene, 1997) . In particular, errors can be serially correlated. It is well known that entering new export markets implies incurring in sunk costs (e.g., setting up distribution networks, adapting products to local specifications, etc). These costs may generate inertia in bilateral trade flows, so that it is more likely to see positive exports of certain goods to certain countries in the current period if these exports have been also positive in the previous period (see Baldwin, 1988; Broto el al., 2006) . A similar pattern would arise when consumer grow accustomed to the partner countries' products, i.e., habit formation (see Bun and Klaaseen, 2002) , in the presence of network and fashion effects (see, e.g., Vettas, 2000) or under stick buyer-supplier relationships due to costly standardized financial assets such as portfolio equity or corporate bonds, as opposite to more homogeneous products such as treasury bonds. 6 Hanson and Feenstra (2001) examine the role of Hong Kong as intermediary for Chinese goods. They show that the markups on reexport of these goods are higher for differentiated products and products with higher variance in export prices, i.e., goods for which switching-in and switching-out (see, e.g., Webster and Wind, 1972; and Rangan and Lawrence, 1999) . When serial correlation is not properly addressed, least squares estimates are inefficient and inference based thereon is adversely affected (see Greene, 1997) . We therefore use standard errors clustered by country pairs to allow for intragroup correlations over time.
Three main econometric issues should be addressed when estimating Equation (1).
First, country fixed effects are included to account for country-level variables such as those traditionally incorporated to proxy for the mass of the trading partners, namely, GDP and population, and what van Wincoop (2003, 2004) refer to multilateral resistance. These variables rather than being time invariant actually change over time. Hence, there is potential for omitted variable biases originated in the time dimension of the data. In order to assess whether this is indeed an issue in our case, we check the robustness of the estimates to replacing time-varying exporter and importer fixed effects for their time-constant versions (see, e.g., Baldwin and Taglioini, 2006; and Ruiz and Vilarrubia, 2007) .
Second, the dependent variable is in fact a count variable that may take the value of zero. Thus, applying natural logarithm implies disregard all observations when a given exporting country does not export any product to a given importing country. If this is more likely to occur when there is no presence of trade promotion institutions of the former country in the latter country (or, for instance, when both are far apart or do not share a common border), then estimates of the parameter of interest will be biased.
Hence, we investigate whether our results are robust to using an econometric strategy that makes use of all observations, including the zero ones. More specifically, we implement the poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator proposed by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) . Third, endogeneity may be present in the form of reverse causality. In particular, countries may set up foreign representations in those partners where exports are relatively large (e.g., Rose, 2007) .
7 Notice, however, that this is less likely to be serious problem for our estimations since they are performed at the sectoral level. More concretely, while quality is relatively difficult to observe or verify and thus services of middlemen to resolve information problems involved in exchange are likely to be required. As mentioned above, we characterize these countries' extensive margin of exports with the number of exported products in each sector. More precisely, our dependent variable is the number of 6-digit HS products exported by a certain country to a specific partner country within each 2-digit SITC sector. To compute this measure we use bilateral export data from the countries listed above to all countries around the world over the period 1995-2004. 9 These data come from COMTRADE.
Following Rauch (1999) , we distinguish goods according to the degree of severity of the information problems their trade faces with in three categories: homogeneous goods (whose prices are quoted in organized exchanges), reference-priced goods (whose prices are only quoted in specialized trade publications), and differentiated goods (with no reference prices). 10 In particular, we use the liberal version of this classification because it is more stringent in typifying goods as differentiated, which we believe is more appropriate for our sample of developing countries. 11 Similar to Hallak (2006) , when a 2-digit sector includes products that belong to different categories, it is broken accordingly, with each part only including the relevant exported goods.
8 Furthermore, results from GMM estimations using the procedure proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) on the whole sample (i.e., pooling over sectors) do not significantly differ from our OLS estimates. These results are available from the authors upon request. 9 In particular, we use mirror values (i.e., imports from Latin American and Caribbean countries). 10 Rauch's (1999) original classification is based on the 4-digit SITC Revision 2. We have mapped this classification into our 6-digit HS classification using conversion tables available in COMTRADE. 11 Estimation results based on the conservative classification coincide with those presented here and are available from the authors upon request.
Data on offices abroad of export promotion agencies have been collected directly from these agencies through a survey (see Jordana et al., 2009) , whereas data on embassies and consulates in each possible trade partner have been collected from the websites of the corresponding Ministries of Foreign Affairs.
12
Our dataset also includes traditional gravity variables. Data on bilateral distance, common border, common language, colonial ties, common colonizer and island and landlocked conditions are from the databases maintained by CEPII. Data on preferential trade agreements are those used by Glick and Rose (2002) and are generously provided by Andrew Rose in his website. These data have been complemented and updated with information reported in the WTO's webpage. Furthermore, in the latter three countries the share of differentiated products that are exported is even lower than that of homogeneous products. and even in this case there is an important variation across countries in how spread these offices are. Thus, while Chile's national export promotion agency is represented in 12 We use two alternative definitions of offices of export promotion offices: a conservative definition, which only considers commercial offices and a liberal definition which also includes representation offices, and promotion and distribution centers. Estimates reported below are based on the former definition. Results obtained with the latter are almost identical and are available from the authors upon request. In addition, we should mention that, due to lack of precise date information, offices of export promotion agencies are assumed to be opened the same year these agencies started to operate. The index t on TPO in Equation (1) then reflects the fact that some agencies began their operations after our initial sample year. Finally, following Rose (2007) , the number of embassies and consulates is determined excluding honorary consulates. This number is assumed to remain constant over the period. This seems to be a sensible assumption as changes in the number of diplomatic foreign missions have not been substantial. 
Estimation Results
In this section we first examine how offices of trade promotion organizations and diplomatic foreign missions affect the overall extensive margin of exports across sectors.
We then turn to specifically investigate whether these effects systematically differ across groups of goods which feature varying degrees of differentiation and whose trade thus faces information-related obstacles of different magnitude.
The top panel of Table 1 reports estimates of Equation (1) Table 2 ).
It should be mentioned herein that, in general, most standard gravity variables have the expected sign and are significant. 13 Thus, preferential trade agreements, lower distance, sharing a common border, direct colonial ties, having a common colonizer, and not being islands are associated with increased diversification across sectors.
14
We next investigate the impact of export promotion institutions on the extensive margin of exports distinguishing across goods with varying degree of differentiation.
15 Table 3 presents the results from pooled estimations and summary measures of those 13 Estimations results are robust to using alternative specifications including binary variables accounting for membership in the WTO and common currencies. These estimation results are available from the authors upon request. 14 Table A1 in the Appendix presents both pooled estimates and summary measures of the estimated coefficients on these variables over sectors. A table with detailed sectoral estimates is available from the authors upon request. 15 Notice that the total number of sectors differs across goods categories. The reason is that trade in specific good categories may not be observed in some sectors (or the number of observations with positive trade is not large enough to perform an estimation).
results based on sector-by-sector estimations, whereas Figure 4 shows the estimated effects of the aforementioned institutions for each sector.
16
Both sets of estimates suggest trade promotion organizations seem to be more effective than diplomatic representations abroad in increasing the extensive margin of exports of differentiated goods and, to less extent, reference-priced goods. In particular, both the number machinery, apparatus, and appliances; road vehicles; textiles yarns, fabrics, and related of sectors for which positive and significant effects are observed and the average effects are larger for these kinds of goods. Thus, for instance, for differentiated products, setting up an office of trade promotion organizations would have a positive effect in 33 sectors, including: power generating machinery and equipment; machinery specialized for particular industries; general industry machinery and equipment; electrical products; articles of apparel and clothing accessories; photographic apparatus; optical goods, and watches; and professional, scientific, and controlling instruments. This positive impact averages 37.7% ((e 0.320 -1)x100=37.7) and reaches a maximum of 85.6% ((e 0.620 -1)x100=85.6) in the case of textiles yarns, fabrics, and related
products. An additional diplomatic foreign mission would, on the other hand, lead to a significant increase in the extensive margin of exports in only 11 sectors with an average impact of 2.0%.
Interestingly, the overall average impact of offices of trade promotion organizations (diplomatic representations), as determined based on the pooled estimates, decreases (increases) as the degree of differentiation of the goods declines. In fact, the difference in the effectiveness of the different institutional arrangements is substantially smaller for the homogeneous goods. This is formally confirmed by the tests of stochastic dominance performed on the distribution of estimated impacts of the aforementioned export promotion institutions across sectors for each good category (see Table 4 ). More specifically, these tests suggest that, while the estimated effects of trade promotion organization stochastically dominate those of foreign diplomatic missions when 16 A table presenting sector specific estimates is available from the authors upon request. favor the expansion of the number of differentiated goods, whereas diplomatic missions seem to contribute more to the increase of homogeneous goods.
As discussed in Section 3, in a panel data setting, standard fixed effects may be insufficient to properly account for country level variables which vary over time thus creating a potential omitted variable bias. This bias source would be eliminated using year-specific exporter and importer fixed effects in Equation (1) Tables 5 and 6 . These results fully confirm our findings.
Moreover, dropping zero observations might potentially result in biased estimates.
Hence, we check the robustness of our findings to using a poisson estimator, which besides allowing us considering zero observations, explicitly takes into account the count nature of the underlying dependent variable. Table 7 presents summary measures of the estimated coefficients on the variables of interest across sectors, while Table 8 reports similar measures distinguishing across categories of goods defined in terms of their degree of differentiation. While the proportion of sectors with positive and significant effects of export promotion institutions changes, overall, averages and ranges of these effects corroborate our main conclusions.
Concluding Remarks
Sectoral and even product concentration of exports has been a distinguishing feature of Latin American and Caribbean countries. This insufficient diversification mightpotentially help to explain why their actual growth performance is below expectations. 18 It should not be then a surprise that this issue has been a longstanding matter of concern for policy makers in these countries.
In recent years, several institutional efforts have been made throughout the region to support the expansion of exports. Some countries have strengthened the commercial functions of their embassies and many have established or re-established export promotion agencies, in most cases with the explicit goal of contributing to diversify the exports. In this paper, we assess whether these export promotion institutions have actually helped increase exports of Latin American and Caribbean countries along the extensive margin over the period 1995-2004.
We have used disaggregated data on bilateral exports from those countries to all countries to examine the impact of foreign representations of trade promotion organizations and embassies and consulates on the extensive margin of trade, i.e., the number of products exported, controlling for standard gravity variables. This analysis has been performed at the sectoral level, both pooling and distinguishing across goods with different degrees of differentiation.
Our findings indicate that export promotion agencies seem to favor the expansion of the extensive margin of exports of more differentiated goods, while embassies and consulates are associated with increased extensive margin of homogeneous goods. There are good reasons for this to be the case. Export promotion agencies are specialized institutions explicitly focused in expanding exports and potentially better endowed in terms of expertise to alleviate the specific problems impeding exports of differentiated products. On the other hand, diplomatic representations usually accomplish diverse tasks, trade promotion being just one of them. Further, embassies do not always have a commercial section. Hence, these foreign missions may also stimulate exports, but more likely through larger exports of products with less severe informational impediments and accordingly lower intensity in the specific skills required to deal with them. These results point out the relevance of having specialized trade promoting services abroad in pursuing export diversification. However, this does not necessarily imply that trade promotion
organizations should necessarily open offices abroad. The aforementioned objective might be also achieved by properly strengthening trade competencies in diplomatic representations.
18 Lack of diversification can be potentially costly in terms of economic growth (e.g., Lederman and Maloney, 2003; and Herzer and Nowak-Lehmann, 2006) . (1). The top panel presents the estimated coefficients on offices of trade promotion organizations and embassies and consulates as obtained when pooling over sectors (sector fixed effects are included in this case). The bottom panel presents the number of sectors where positive and significant, negative and significant, and non-significant estimated coefficients are registered for these variables along with their respective relevant summary measures (maximum, minimum, and simple average). Standard errors clustered by country pairs are used to assess the significance of these coefficients. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. (1) distinguishing across categories of goods defined in terms of their degree of differentiation (see Rauch , 1999) . The top panel presents the estimated coefficients on offices of trade promotion organizations and embassies and consulates as obtained when pooling over sectors (sector fixed effects are included in this case). The bottom panel presents the number of sectors where positive and significant, negative and significant, and non-significant estimated coefficients are registered for these variables along with their respective relevant summary measures (maximum, minimum, and simple average). Standard errors clustered by country pairs are used to assess the significance of these coefficients. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Rauch , 1999) . *significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. (1), which includes exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects instead of their time invariant counterparts. The top panel presents the estimated coefficients on offices of trade promotion organizations and embassies and consulates as obtained when pooling over sectors (sector fixed effects are included in this case). The bottom panel presents the number of sectors where positive and significant, negative and significant, and non-significant estimated coefficients are registered for these variables along with their respective relevant summary measures (maximum, minimum, and simple average). # The estimated coefficient on EmbCon is negative and significant, but it is very small in absolute value. Standard errors clustered by country pairs are used to assess the significance of these coefficients. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. (1), which includes exporter-year and importer-year fixed effects instead of their time invariant counterparts, distinguishing across categories of goods defined in terms of their degree of differentiation (see Rauch , 1999) . The top panel presents the estimated coefficients on offices of trade promotion organizations and embassies and consulates as obtained when pooling over sectors (sector fixed effects are included in this case). The bottom panel presents the number of sectors where positive and significant, negative and significant, and non-significant estimated coefficients are registered for these variables along with their respective relevant summary measures (maximum, minimum, and simple average). Standard errors clustered by country pairs are used to assess the significance of these coefficients. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. (1). The top panel presents the estimated coefficients on offices of trade promotion organizations and embassies and consulates as obtained when pooling over sectors (sector fixed effects are included in this case). The bottom panel presents the number of sectors where positive and significant, negative and significant, and non-significant estimated coefficients are registered for these variables along with their respective relevant summary measures (maximum, minimum, and simple average). Standard errors clustered by country pairs are used to assess the significance of these coefficients. * significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. The figure shows the number of products exported by each sample country relative to the total number of products in each good category identified in the classification proposed by Rauch (1999 
Number of Countries where Offices of Trade Promotion Organizations and Embassies or Consulates are Present, 2004
The figure reports the number of importing countries where exporting countries have diplomatic missions (embassies and/or consulates). In the case of Guatemala, it was not always possible to determine which of the consulates were honorary. We include them all. 
Figure 3 Distribution of Sectoral Estimated Effects
The figure is a kernel density of the estimated effects of the presence of an office of the trade promotion organizations and those associated with adding a new foreign diplomatic mission in the importing countries on the extensive margin of exports across sectors. These estimated effects have been obtained estimating Equation (1) separately for each 2-digit SITC sector. 
Figure 4 Sectoral Estimated Estimates by Good Categories
Differentiated Goods
Reference-Priced Goods Homogeneous Goods
The figure reports the estimated effects of the presence of an office of the trade promotion organizations and those associated with adding a new foreign diplomatic mission in the importing countries on the extensive margin of exports for each sector across good categories identified in the classification proposed by Rauch (1999) .. These estimated effects have been obtained estimating Equation (1) separately for each 2-digit SITC sector. 
